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Is Technology Raising Demand for Skills,
or Are Skills Raising Demand for Technology?
Since the late 1990s, incomes of 
the highest earning Americans have 
risen faster than the income of other 
Americans, a trend that has not gone 
unnoticed by the press.1  The recent 
rise follows a decade of relative sta-
bility in income distribution, but it 
resumes a pattern of growing inequal-
common view is that recent technological 
advances, such as the introduction of 
computers, have rendered obsolete some 
occupations that require less skill and have 
increased businesses’ desire to hire skilled workers. 
However, some economists have challenged this view: 
What if the rising skills of U.S. workers are inducing 
businesses to adopt — and maybe even develop — new 
technologies that require workers who are more skilled? In
this article, Ethan Lewis assesses this alternative view. To 
do so, he examines the evidence that increasing skills are 
driving technological change.
ity that began in earnest in the 1970s. 
Until recently, a standard explanation 
for rising inequality was that a steady 
flow of technological advances, such as 
the increasing power and falling price 
of computers, has raised the desire of 
businesses to hire skilled workers and 
has made obsolete some occupations 
that require less skill. Economists call 
this phenomenon “skill-biased techno-
logical change” because new technolo-
gies are “biased” toward raising the 
productivity (and, hence, wages) of 
the most skilled workers. The primary 
direct evidence for this explanation is 
that the use of advanced technologies 
is more common among more-skilled, 
highly paid workers and in plants and 
industries with more-skilled workers.2
Some economists, however, have 
challenged this standard view, arguing 
the reverse: Rising skills of U.S. work-
ers — as evidenced by the rising pro-
portion of people who complete college 
— are driving businesses to adopt and 
possibly even to develop new technolo-
gies that require more-skilled workers. 
Paul Beaudry and David Green argue 
that the decision to use new technol-
ogy is not automatic but depends criti-
cally on the availability of skilled labor 
and capital.  Daron Acemoglu goes 
further, arguing that as the propor-
tion of workers who are skilled rises, 
inventors will direct more effort toward 
technological advances that skilled 
workers can use.3  The distinction is 
subtle.  Technology is still involved in 
rising inequality, but it is the increase 
in the proportion of workers who are 
skilled, rather than technology per se, 
that is the cause of rising inequality.
This article assesses the alterna-
tive views that recent technological 
advances may have driven up inequal-
ity or that rising skills may be driving 
technological advances. It begins by 
examining the recent changes in the 
income distribution. How exactly 
has the distribution been changing, 
and why might technological forces 
1Both the Wall Street Journal and the New York 
Times have recently published series on rising 
inequality.  See, for example, the article by Da-
vid Johnston and the one by David Wessel.
2 Wage and skill are closely related. In a per-
fectly competitive labor market, a worker’s wage 
exactly reflects how productive the worker is, 
which, in turn, depends on her skill level. In
practice, that is not always true (wages might 
also reflect a worker’s bargaining power, for 
example), but highly paid workers do tend to 
have higher values of observable characteristics 
that are valued in the labor market, such as 
education and work experience. Skill-biased 
technological change, it is argued, has raised 
the value, or “price,” of skills in the market and, 
hence, the wages of skilled workers compared to 
those of less skilled workers.
3 Keith Sill’s article describes Acemoglu’s theory 
of directed technical change in more detail.be responsible? Is there any direct 
evidence that new technologies favor 
skilled workers? Is the association large 
enough to explain rising inequality? 
Are rising skills driving technological 
change?
RECENT CHANGES IN THE
WAGE STRUCTURE
The basic facts about rising in-
equality were presented in an article 
by Keith Sill, but they bear repeating 
here.  The most basic fact is that the 
gap between the wages of the most 
highly paid workers and others has 
been rising in recent decades in the 
U.S., especially in the 1980s and in 
the late 1990s (Figure 1).  The figure 
shows an index of hourly wages (adjust-
ed for changes in the cost of living) in 
different parts of the wage distribution 
from 1979 to 2003.  For our purposes 
here, I exclude women; only men’s 
wages have been used in the calcula-
tions.  (Inequality growth is smaller if 
women are included: Women’s wages 
are rising over this period compared to 
men’s. For more on this, see Women’s 
Wages and Increasing Inequality.)  The 
90th percentile line represents the wage 
for high-skill men: Only 10 percent of 
men earn more than this wage.  The 
10th percentile line represents the wage 
for low-skill men: only 10 percent of 
workers earn less than this wage.  The 
median, or 50th percentile, represents 
the middle of the distribution. The top 
line in Figure 1 shows the gap between 
the 90th percentile and median wages, 
a measure of inequality.  The figure 
reveals that the growth in inequality 
has been driven not only by the rising 
wages of high earners but also by the 
falling wages of low and median earn-
ers.
At least some of the increase in 
wage inequality, and some argue most 
of it, seems to be due to rising “return” 
to skill, that is, an increasing wage pre-
mium paid to workers with more skills.4  
Data Source: Current Population Survey merged outgoing rotation groups, 1979-2003. Calculations 
include working males age 16-65 old enough to be out of school.  Wages are adjusted for changes in 
the cost of living. 
* 90-50 gap is the percentage difference between the hourly wage of the median male worker and the 
hourly wage of the male worker earning the 90th percentile wage.
FIGURE 1
Real Hourly Wages (Males), 1979-2003
One place this shows up is in the rising 
gap between the wages of more and 
less educated workers.  Figure 2 shows 
wage indexes at different education 
levels, again for male workers only.  
These indexes are adjusted for changes 
in the cost of living, and in this case, 
they are also adjusted to represent 
workers who have similar amounts of 
work experience (15 years).  The upper 
line shows that the return to a college 
degree — the percentage difference 
in earnings between a college degree 
and a high school diploma — has risen 
dramatically in the past few decades: 
from 30 percent to 50 percent. Earn-
ings gaps between the other levels of 
education have also risen, as seen in 
the spreading out of lines in the lower 
part of Figure 2. Adjusted for inflation, 
the earnings of less educated workers, 
especially high-school dropouts, have 
fallen.
At the same time that the rela-
tive wages of more educated workers 
have been rising, the proportion of 
4 Interestingly, wage inequality has increased 
even among workers with very similar charac-
teristics (for example, the same education, work 
experience, and occupation), which suggests 
not all of the increase in inequality should be 
attributed to an increased skill premium.  How-
ever, Chinhui Juhn, Kevin Murphy, and Brooks 
Pierce argue that increases in inequality among 
similar workers could reflect increasing returns 
to skills that are not easily measured.
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Data Source: Current Population Survey, merged outgoing rotation groups. 
*Wages are adjusted to reflect the mean for males with 15 years of work experience and for changes 
in the cost of living.
** Exactly 4-year degree.  The series is broken between 1991 and 1992 because of a change in how 
the education question was asked beginning in 1992. 
*** Percentage difference between the average male worker with 15 years of experience with exactly 
a 4-year college education and one with exactly a high-school diploma.
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workers who complete more education 
— the supply of skilled workers — has 
also been rising (Figure 3). The figure 
reports the fraction of workers with 
different levels of education. The frac-
tion of workers who are high-school 
dropouts trends down, while the frac-
tion with at least some college educa-
tion trends up. If demand for different 
types of workers remains the same, a 
simple model of supply and demand 
would suggest that as the educational 
level of the work force rises, the gap 
between the wages of more and less 
educated workers should narrow. That 
the gap actually widened suggests that 
the availability of skilled workers may 
not have kept up with the pace at 
which businesses wanted to hire them, 
causing wages for skilled workers to 
rise. Another way to say this is that 
demand for skilled workers rose faster 
than supply.
There are competing explanations 
for the simultaneous rise in the 
supply of skilled workers and their 
relative wages. A standard view is 
that skill-biased technological change 
is responsible. This view originates 
from the observation that rising 
inequality coincides with the spread of 
computers: The PC was introduced in 
1981, for example, and the late 1990s 
“tech boom” was a period of rapid 
investment in and diffusion of new 
information technologies (for example, 
the Internet and e-mail).  This view 
posits that skilled workers are needed 
to operate and maintain computer 
technology, so demand for skilled labor 
rose after its introduction.
But the timing of the spread of 
computers is a weak argument for its 
effect on the returns to skill. The rise 
in inequality in the 1980s was largely 
due to a decline in the wages of less-
skilled workers. As many researchers 
have pointed out, this may have been 
caused by other contemporaneous 
forces, including an influx of less-
skilled immigrants, declining union 
participation, and increasing trade 
with the developing world.5 Other 
forces that may have increased 
inequality and skill premiums in 
the 1980s include an increase in 
the proportion of women working 
(see Women’s Wages and Increasing 
Inequality) and the substantial erosion 
in the real value of the minimum 
wage (Figure 4).  A careful analysis 
by David Lee shows that the decline 
in the minimum wage may have been 
largely responsible for the increase in 
inequality during the 1980s.6
Still, economists disagree about 
the degree of influence of these other 
forces on inequality.  Proponents of 
skill-biased technological change have 
pointed out that alternative forces like 
the minimum wage have little to say 
about why the wages of skilled work-
ers would rise.7 Also, the late 1990s 
5  For more on these factors, see Sill’s article.
6 Lee supports this view by showing that in-
equality rose in poorer states where many work-
ers were earning the federal minimum wage 
and rose hardly at all in richer states where few 
earned the minimum wage.
7 See the article by David Autor, Lawrence 
Katz, and Melissa Kearney.20 Q2 2006Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
Women’s Wages and Increasing Inequality
M
ost researchers who study the recent increases 
in wage inequality exclude women from their 
analysis. This is an important omission. If
women are included in the calculations, re-
cent increases in inequality are substantially 
smaller.  This is shown in Figure 1a, which 
is identical to Figure 1 in the text except that both men and 
women are included in the calculations. Compared to Figure 1, 
the 90-50 wage gap measure of inequality increased by only half 
as much over the last 25 years and has changed little since the 
mid-1990s.
The reason inequality growth is smaller when women are 
included is that women’s wages compared to men’s rose rapidly 
over the same 25-year period. Figure 1b shows that women’s 
mean hourly wages rose from only 67 percent to nearly 85 per-
cent of male mean wages in the past 25 years. One force that 
may have made women’s wages increase is women’s increasing 
participation in the work force. Figure 1b also shows that during 
this same period, the proportion of women who work rose from 
60 to 70 percent.a Another force is the rising skills of women. 
Women have increased their presence in professional occupa-
tions, especially since the late 1960s, a change research has 
linked to women’s increased ability to delay child-bearing after 
the birth-control pill became widely available.b Changing social 
norms may have also played a role in raising women’s ability to 
advance in professional careers.
Because researchers want to ignore these compositional 
changes in the work force when studying skill-biased techno-
logical change, they have typically excluded women from the 
analysis.  Put another way, proponents of skill-biased technical 
change argue the wage paid to a skilled worker is higher today 
than a similarly skilled worker in the past; they argue that 
including women would risk clouding the analysis because it 
would mix the rising “price” of skill with an increase in the pro-
portion of workers who are skilled (owing to women’s increased 
presence in highly skilled occupations).c
While this is a widely held view, other research that ex-
amines women’s wages more closely tends to reject the idea that 
changes in women’s and men’s wage distributions can be treated 
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FIGURE 1a
Real Hourly Wages Including Women
Data Source: CPS, merged outgoing rotation groups, 1979-2003. Calcula-
tions include working men and women age 16-65 old enough to be out of 
school. Wages are adjusted for changes in the cost of living. 
* 90-50 gap is the percentage difference between the hourly wage of the 
median worker and the hourly wage of the worker earning the 90th
percentile wage.
FIGURE 1b
Women: Proportion Working and Hourly 
Wage as a Proportion of Men’s
Data Source: Current Population Survey, merged outgoing rotation groups, 
1979-2003.
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aBeyond this most recent period, since World War II there has been a 
dramatic increase in how much women — especially married women 
— work. Aubhik Khan’s Business Review article describes some of the 
possible causes of this.
bSee the article by Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz.
cA more subtle issue that worries economists is that women are “self-
selected”: that is, not all women work, and those who do may have 
very different earnings capacity from those who do not. If the amount 
of selection has changed over time — and the fact that the propor-
tion of women who work has increased suggests that it has — it would 
confound measures of inequality growth. In fact, Casey Mulligan and 
Yona Rubinstein argue that women’s wages have increased entirely 
because highly skilled women used to not work, and now they do.  This 
“problem” can be overstated. The proportion of men working is also 
not 100 percent (in 2003, 83 percent of men age 16-65 worked) and 
has also been changing over time (it has been falling). However, most 
economists believe selection problems are smaller for men than they are 
for women.Business Review Q2 2006 21 www.philadelphiafed.org
Women’s Wages and Increasing Inequality (continued)
find that as women have entered into high-wage jobs, they have 
displaced some men, leading both male inequality and women’s 
wages to rise at the same time. A version of their analysis is 
shown in Figure 1c, which gives the distribution of men’s and 
women’s wages in 1979 and 2003 (on a natural log scale). In
1979, many women were concentrated in jobs earning near the 
minimum wage, while men were disproportionately high earn-
ers. By 2003 men’s and women’s wage distributions converged 
and became more symmetric, as women rose to the part of the 
wage distribution where men formerly dominated, and men 
fell to the part of the wage distribution where women formerly 
dominated. Fortin and Lemieux argue that the increased com-
petition from women in high-wage jobs may have increased male 
wage inequality, a circumstance that is missed by focusing on 
changes in male wages alone.d
However, recent research by Marigee Bacolod and Ber-
nardo Blum argues skill-biased technological change might also 
partly explain the increase in women’s wages.  They show that 
women are concentrated in occupations that require “cognitive” 
skills (for example, doctors) whose wages have risen (arguably 
because of skill-biased technological change), while more men 
than women are in occupations that require “motor” skills (for 
example, mechanics) whose wages have been falling. They find 
that the changes in the prices of different skills account for at 
least 80 percent of the observed increase in women’s wages com-
pared to men’s, which may mean that skill-biased technological 
change has helped raise women’s wages compared to men’s.e
FIGURE 1c
Distribution of Men’s and Women’s Real 



















appear to be different from the 1980s: 
The increase in inequality in the late 
1990s was driven largely by the rapid 
increase in the wages of skilled work-
ers.
To bolster their case, proponents 
of skill-biased technological change 
have attempted to find more direct 
evidence of the link between technol-
ogy and wages using data on individual 
workers, industries, and plants.
d The figure also nicely shows the role that the fall in the minimum 
wage may have played in increasing inequality. In 1979, when minimum 
wages were high, the figure shows that wages are compressed in a spike 
near the minimum wage. After the real value of the minimum wage fell 
in the 1980s (see Figure 4 in the text), this spike in the wage distribu-
tion disappears.
eOn the other hand, the fall in the price of motor skills might reflect 
other forces such as de-unionization and a fall in the real value of the 
minimum wage, rather than technological change.
Data Source: Current Population Surveys. Wages are in 2000 dollars.
EVIDENCE FROM WORKERS,
INDUSTRIES, AND PLANTS
Workers.  Alan Krueger was one 
of the first to attempt to show directly 
that computers may make workers, 
especially skilled workers, more pro-
ductive. Using data on individual 
workers’ wages and on-the-job com-
puter use, he showed that workers who 
used a computer at work earned wages 
that were 15 to 20 percent higher than 
those who did not.  This earnings pre-
mium remained when controlling for 
characteristics of workers, such as age, 
education, and occupation. In addi-
tion, Krueger found that the premium 
was especially large for more educated 
workers, suggesting that the technology 
favored more-skilled workers. On the 
basis of this finding, Krueger argued 
that the increased use of computers 
over time has led to an increase in in-















 Data Source: Current Population Survey, merged outgoing rotation groups.  The series is broken 
between 1991 and 1992 because of a change in how the education question was asked beginning in 
1992.
FIGURE 3
Rising Skills: Percent of Workers by Education
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Data Source: Current Population Survey, merged outgoing rotation groups, 1979-2003. 
See previous figures for further notes.
FIGURE 4
Wages of Less-Skilled Males and the
Federal Minimum Wage
equality. He showed that, based on his 
estimates, as much as half of the rise in 
the college/high-school wage gap (see 
Figure 2) might be explained by com-
puterization of the workplace.
In contrast to Krueger, Robert 
Valletta showed growing computer use 
at work is not likely to be responsible 
for growing inequality. Taking at face 
value the wage premium on computer 
use, his approach asks how much lower 
inequality would have been if differ-
ent groups of workers (defined by work 
experience, education, gender, and 
race, among other things) had not 
increased their computer use between 
1984 and 2003. During these 19 years 
Valetta estimates that on-the-job 
computer use rose substantially, from 
25 percent to 57 percent of workers. 
Surprisingly, though, he finds that this 
led to virtually no increase in inequal-
ity.  The basic idea behind this result is 
that the increase in computer use has 
been widespread, not limited to the 
most highly paid workers. As a result, 
although rising computer use may have 
made workers more productive and 
raised the general level of wages, it is 
unlikely to have increased the spread 
between high and low wages.
John DiNardo and Steffen Pischke 
provide further reason for skepticism 
about evidence based on association 
between computer use and skills. Using 
data on German workers, they showed 
that observationally similar workers 
who use a pencil at work earn a wage 
“premium” similar to that of those who 
use a computer at work. Since the use 
of a pencil does not require special 
skills, they conclude that one must be 
cautious about interpreting any wage 
premium on computer use. High-pay-
ing jobs may be more likely to involve 
a computer, they argue, but it is not 
necessarily the computer that makes 
the job high paying.
Industries.  David Autor, Frank 
Levy, and Richard Murnane contrib-
ute to this debate by specifying the 
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mechanism by which computers affect 
the wage structure, and they provide 
empirical support for their view. They 
argue that computers replace routine 
cognitive tasks, that is, those tasks 
that involve thinking but that can be 
easily codified into a set of instructions 
for a computer. Recordkeeping is an 
example of a cognitive routine task.  
Creative writing is a nonroutine cogni-
tive task: Computers cannot substitute 
for humans in this task. Autor and his 
co-authors also distinguish manual 
tasks from cognitive tasks and argue 
that computers replace only routine 
cognitive tasks (though factory auto-
mation, discussed below, may replace 
some routine manual tasks as well). As
the price of computers falls, workers 
who perform routine cognitive tasks 
will likely be replaced by computers 
(or take a cut in wages), while skilled 
workers will be more productive be-
cause they can spend more time on 
nonroutine tasks.
To evaluate this view, the authors 
examined the relationship between 
the tasks performed in different oc-
cupations and increases in computer 
use over a long period. They use Labor 
Department surveys to measure how 
much routine cognitive, nonroutine 
cognitive, routine manual, and non-
routine manual tasks were required 
in each occupation. They found that 
the more an industry increased its use 
of computers between 1984 and 1997, 
the more it decreased its employment 
of workers in routine cognitive oc-
cupations and increased employment 
of workers in nonroutine cognitive 
occupations in recent decades. In the 
1960s, before the widespread introduc-
tion of computers, the authors find 
little shift in occupation mix in the 
same industries. Though the evidence 
is supportive of their view, the authors 
are careful to acknowledge that the 
association between occupation shifts 
and computer use does not necessar-
ily imply that the shift was caused by 
computerization.
Plants. Computers are not the 
only technology that may have con-
tributed to rising inequality. Over the 
past few decades, manufacturing plants 
have become more automated as tech-
nologies such as robotics have become 
increasingly powerful and prevalent. 
Some research has focused on the im-
pact of factory automation.
Mark Doms, Timothy Dunne, 
and Kenneth Troske obtained detailed 
data on the use of a variety of new 
automation technologies at a sample 
of manufacturing plants, as well as the 
characteristics of the workers at those 
same plants. They found that more-
automated plants paid higher wages 
and had a higher proportion of workers 
who were college graduates, engineers, 
and nonproduction workers. However, 
they also found that the same plants 
had more skilled workers long before 
the technologies were introduced. 
Like DiNardo and Pischke’s result for 
pencils, this finding suggests that au-
tomation was not necessarily the cause 
of the increased employment of skilled 
workers, even if it is associated with it.
GEOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN
TECHNOLOGY USE
Another way to explain the re-
lationship between technology and 
income inequality is to treat different 
parts of the U.S. as different “markets.” 
This approach takes advantage of the 
fact that there are wide differences in 
technology use and the availability of 
skilled workers in different regions of 
the U.S. To assess the causal relation-
ship between technology and skills, I
examined, in a previous article, how 
the relative availability of skilled and 
unskilled workers in a plant’s local 
geographic market (metropolitan area) 
affected automation.8 Aiding this ap-
proach is the fact that some differences 
in skill mix across local markets occur 
for idiosyncratic reasons that prob-
ably have little to do with technology. 
For example, some markets have a lot 
of less-skilled workers because they 
contain enclaves of less-skilled immi-
grants, whose numbers have increased 
rapidly in recent decades. Los Angeles, 
for example, has twice as many high-
school dropouts per capita as other 
cities, largely because it is a major 
destination for Mexican immigrants, 
many of whom arrive in the U.S. with-
out a high school diploma. 
On the other end, some markets 
have a lot of highly educated workers 
because they were lucky enough to 
receive federal funds to build land-
grant universities in the 19th century. 
These idiosyncratic differences provide 
natural “experiments” to evaluate the 
causal relationship between skills and 
technology.
In this earlier work, I found that 
in places with abundant unskilled 
labor, plants are less automated, and 
in places where skilled labor is abun-
dant, plants are more automated. In
addition, increases over time in the 
availability of skilled labor lead plants 
to increase their use of automation. 
This suggests that plants adopted these 
technologies to fill shortages of un-
skilled labor. Put another way, the use 
of technology responds to the amount 
of skilled labor available to operate it.
Looking across geographic mar-
kets also reveals a similar relationship 
for computers.  In another article, I
used another “natural experiment” 
— the aftermath of the Mariel boatlift, 
the 1980 exodus of Cubans that dra-
matically increased the availability of 
unskilled labor in Miami — to evalu-
ate the impact of skills on technology.9
I found that businesses in Miami were 
much slower to adopt computers at 
8 See my 2005 Business Review article.
9 See my 2004 working paper.work after the boatlift than businesses 
in other, similar cities. 
In another recent paper, Mark 
Doms and I examined businesses’ 
adoption of personal computers in the 
1990s. We found that the adoption of 
PCs by otherwise similar businesses 
depended on the availability of col-
lege-educated labor in the local mar-
ket.  For example, Figure 5 presents 
a version of a scatter plot from this 
paper.  It plots the number of personal 
computers per employee in the average 
business, adjusted for the businesses’ 
industry and employment, in different 
metropolitan areas against the share 
of the workers in that area who are 
college educated.10  The college share 
is measured in 1980, before businesses 
used PCs, while computer use is mea-
sured in 2000, by which time PCs were 
the dominant computing technology 
(used by 50 percent of workers).  The 
figure shows that high-skill cities, such 
as San Francisco, use personal com-
puters intensively, while cities with 
fewer college-educated workers, such 
as Scranton, use computers less inten-
sively. Philadelphia is near the middle 
of this skills-technology relationship. 
Once again, the data in the figure 
have been adjusted for industry and 
size. For example, the figure adjusts for 
factors such as San Francisco’s large 
“tech” sector and New York’s large 
financial sector (both are computer-
intensive sectors). Another way to say 
this is that very similar businesses, for 
example, law firms of a certain size, 
10 The data for this figure come from two sourc-
es. College share comes from author’s tabula-
tions from the 1980 Census of Population, while 
personal computers per worker is tabulated 
from the “Harte-Hanks” data set, a proprietary 
establishment-level survey of technology use. 
Personal computers per employee figures are 
adjusted to control for the industry and size of 
the establishment. (Interestingly, this adjust-
ment makes little difference!) College share 
includes all those with a four-year college degree 
plus one-half of those with one to three years of 
college education.
appear to vary their use of personal 
computers depending on the local 
availability of college-educated labor.11
In one sense, these results support 
the notion of skill-biased technologi-
cal change, since they imply that as 
technology gets cheaper, firms replace 
unskilled workers with cheaper tech-
nology and hire more skilled workers. 
But these results also provide a more 
complex view of the increased use of 
skilled labor and the adoption of new 
technologies. It is not only the avail-
ability of new technology that induces 
plants to hire skilled workers but also 
the availability of skilled workers that 
induces plants to adopt new technol-
ogy. In this alternative view, recent 
FIGURE 5
Personal Computers/Employee vs. College 
Education by Metropolitan Area
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*Data Source: Harte-Hanks, 2000-2002.  Figures report number of personal computers per worker at 
the average business, adjusted for industry and establishment size (employment).
**Data Source: Census of Population, 1980.  Figures report share of workers with at least a 4-year
college degree + 1/2 of the share of workers with 1-3 years of college education.
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technological change may result partly 
from the rising skills of U.S. workers 
(see Figure 3) rather than being a fully 
independent force affecting the labor 
market.
CONCLUSION
Wage inequality has risen over the 
past few decades. Many economists 
believe that this is related to steady 
advances in and the diffusion of infor-
mation and automation technologies, 
which may favor the employment of 
skilled workers. Though this explana-
tion is appealing because technology 
has rapidly become more prevalent and 
is more often used by skilled workers, 
recent research finds that it is not con-
sistent with many of the facts.12  Other 
11 In a similar result, Nicole Nestoriak found 
that plants in areas with an abundance of highly 
paid workers invested more in computing tech-
nology.
12 See the article by David Card and
John DiNardo.REFERENCES
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forces, such as falling minimum wages, 
appear to have played a role in rising 
inequality. Researchers have also had 
difficulty establishing definitively that 
new technologies actually cause the 
number of jobs for skilled workers to 
increase. Some evidence even suggests 
the reverse: The spread of new tech-
nologies responds to the rising skills 
of the work force, rather than being 
an independent force affecting the de-
mand for skills.
Economists are likely to continue 
to debate this issue. The latest in-
crease in inequality, in the late 1990s, 
occurred during the period of rapid 
investment in information technology. 
This episode will be sure to inspire 
further research.
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